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ABSTRACT17
This article studies incentives to share risk as a risk management tool to address issues of18
interdependency between risk assessment, risk perception, and risk management in large civil19
engineering projects. We study the decision problem of an operator in charge of constructing20
reliable sea defences and show that operators have no incentive to reduce the likelihood of rare21
but extreme floods because their liability for damage costs cannot exceed the value of their private22
assets. We evaluate the level of liability that induces cost-effective safety measures to reduce the23
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probability of extreme events without bankrupting the operator and study its impact on the welfare24
of society. It turns out that society will be better protected at a significantly lower cost when25
tacitly retaining the residual risk of extreme damage costs. The findings offer an explanation as to26
why stakeholders tend to ignore the potential costly consequences entailed by the failure of civil27
engineering projects. Although these catastrophic failures are rare, this paper contends that society,28
as a whole, should bear the residual risk of such events.29
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INTRODUCTION30
Motivation31
The implementation of large civil engineering projects requires economic agents to assume32
responsibility for a range of activities that create a number of interrelated risks ranging from33
technical feasibility to costs. The risk management of such projects must therefore be concerned34
with developing strategies to reduce the probability of negative events while taking into account35
that they may occur nevertheless. Modern risk management of civil engineering projects must be36
aware of economic, environmental, engineering, and societal aspects and consider the full gamut of37
possible actions that mitigate risk. The design of risk management strategies for civil engineering38
projects as well as the achievement of its objectives requires the participation of various stakeholders39
of the general public and the private sector. Themain stakeholders in large civil engineering projects40
are the government, a regulator, an operator, and society. Governments commission operators for41
the implementation of a project and use regulators and advisory bodies to supervise and manage42
the safety of the project. A typical example is portrayed in Figure 1.43
A key responsibility of regulators is to protect society against the excessive risk taking of opera-44
tors. The right to compensation against an operator is exercised in accordance to the Convention on45
Third Party Liability (Organisation For Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1982).46
The operator of a nuclear installation, for example, is liable for loss of life of any person and47
damage to any property caused by the installation. The mechanism that protects society is the48
contractual relationship between the government, the regulator, and the operator, which determines49
the risk management strategy. A main feature of any contractual relationship is the existence of50
asymmetric information. (Xiang et al. 2012) point out that in the context of civil engineering, a51
contract between a government and an operator involves two types of informational asymmetries,52
which create uncertainty. At the bidding stage, the government is better informed regarding the53
technological know-how, the equipment, and the management abilities of the operator. At the54
performance stage, the operator has an informational advantage with regard to the expertise of the55
personnel and the quality of technology used.56
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An important issue in the construction of public facilities is the pressure on operators to57
complete a project on budget and on time. This common problem is often caused by narrow58
profit margins. Equally important to note is that monitoring operators is very costly for society59
and that regulators may not have the capacity to verify the effectiveness of implemented safety60
measures. Informational asymmetries alongside these issues thus entail a moral hazard problem in61
the sense that governments and regulators cannot observe whether the operator has implemented62
cost-effective risk mitigation measures.63
A recent example of the consequences of moral hazard is the Fukushima accident. As argued in64
(Ramseyer 2012), moral hazard arises as soon as potential losses exceed the value of the company.65
As a private company, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the Japanese operator of the power66
plant, knew that it could not be made liable beyond the value of its net assets. Beyond that value, the67
company would be unable to pay for risks beyond a certain magnitude, the company would earn all68
returns but bear none of the costs. This observation explains why TEPCO underplayed the risk of69
large earthquakes and tsunamis. On March 2011, the magnitude 9.0 Tohoko-oki earthquake shook70
north-eastern Japan, unleashing a savage tsunami. A 15-meter high tsunami hit the Fukushima71
Daiichi nuclear power plant and triggered a nuclear accident by disabling the power supply and72
heat sinks, see (Kurokawa et al. 2012). Before the accident, TEPCO conducted an experimental73
risk analysis of a tsunami hitting the Fukushima site. In its report, TEPCO’s experts estimated the74
probability of a tsunami hitting the Fukushima coast area above 5.7 meters within the next 50 years75
at 10 percent and the probability of a tsunami hitting above 10 meters at 1 percent. In 2006, TEPCO76
presented these results at the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE14), where77
they fostered the belief that Fukushima was safe despite historical evidence that tsunamis of 978
meters or higher had occurred in the region, cf. (Acton and Hibbs 2012).79
In 2006 and in 2008, civil engineering specialists at TEPCO carried out a more comprehensive80
risk assessment, called “Probabilistic Safety Assessment” (PSA), and compiled numerical evidence81
that the probability for tsunamis higher than 10 meters was significantly greater than in the original82
analysis, cf. (Acton and Hibbs 2012). TEPCO, however, decided that the risk of such extreme83
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tsunamis was negligible and assumed full liability for possible accidents. By dismissing the findings84
of their risk assessment, TEPCO ignored best practices promulgated by the International Atomic85
Energy Association (IAEA) and the Japan Society of Civil Engineering.86
(Acton and Hibbs 2012) identified a number of flaws in TEPCO’s risk analysis. The risk87
assessment methodology adopted by TEPCO, for example, ignored important determinants, such88
as the hydrodynamic forces of a tsunami and the effects of debris and sediment transported in a89
tsunami run-up. A number of official reports, including the ones by the Japanese Nuclear Accident90
Investigation Commission, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the European Nuclear91
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the92
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, came to the unanimous conclusion that TEPCO93
had implemented insufficient safety measures. These reports argue that elevating the power plant,94
building a higher seawall, and installing a back-up generator could have mitigated or even prevented95
the catastrophic consequences of the tsunami, see e.g. (Acton and Hibbs 2012; Weightman and96
Jamet 2011; Kurokawa et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2011).97
Accidents, such as the Fukushima incident, reveal that there are several issues of interdepen-98
dency between risk assessment, risk perception, and risk management. These interdependencies99
can be analysed using the conceptual framework of Paul Kleindorfer as described in (Cohen and100
Kunreuther 2007) and are illustrated in Figure 2.101
For instance, flaws in the risk assessment modelling such as omitting critical parameters, or an102
erroneous interpretation of the risk assessment due to biased perception of risk, e.g. underestimating103
residual risk, can lead to underinvestment in safety measures. In light of this observation, an104
important aspect of managing risk in highly interdependent systems is the provision of incentives105
to ensure appropriate levels of investment into safety measures that mitigate risk, see (Aven 2016;106
Cohen and Kunreuther 2007). In cases where operators do not implement these voluntarily, it107
may be necessary to utilize regulation and/or to impose standards that convince operators of the108
financial benefits of these measures, see (Aven 2016; Cohen and Kunreuther 2007). The efficiency109
of such a policy, however, needs to be evaluated from a societal viewpoint, in order to guarantee110
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that its implementation does not leave society worse off than under the status quo. (Aven 2016)111
has pointed out that risk management has to balance out competing interest such as profits, safety,112
and reputation, while respecting the constraints imposed by risk acceptance criteria. Public risk113
acceptance has changed notably in recent times despite the fact that the frequency of accidents114
has not increased. This change was observed in local communities in South Korea, e.g. Yeongdok115
and Samcheok, whose residents had traditionally been supportive of nuclear technology. In April116
2015, however, they opposed plans to build nuclear power plants in these regions because of117
safety concerns, see (Dalton 2016). If risk acceptance criteria are to be introduced as a risk118
management tool and formulated by the authorities as proposed by (Abrahamsen and Aven 2012),119
the implementation of protective measures that account for any conceivable event would make these120
projects economically unviable.121
Motivated by the Fukushima accident, this article addresses the following issues. From the122
perspective of businessmanagement, wewill evaluate the level of liability that induces cost-effective123
safety measures to reduce the probability of extreme events without bankrupting the operator in case124
of an accident. From a societal perspective, we explore the extent to which such risk regulatory125
policies will improve the welfare of society. Our analysis is particularly relevant for industries126
that are subject to a ’risk-informed, performance-based’ regulatory approach, e.g. as pursued by127
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, because it involves a risk-weighted analysis,128
whereas the classical compliance-based regulatory approach considers risk associated with rare129
events as negligible, see (Saji 2003).130
Related literature131
The business management literature has studied the relationship between regulatory policies132
and risk management. For instance, (Hausken and Zhuang 2013) analyse the trade-off between133
the safety demands by a government and production targets of a company. In their model, safety134
measures are strategic complements. They show how taxation can reduce the company’s free135
riding on safety measures implemented by the government. Along these lines, (Cheung and136
Zhuang 2012) analyse the implemented safety effort and the level of production of competing137
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companies in a regulatory game. They show that competition increases a company’s threshold for138
risk exposure and therefore requires stricter regulation. In a different set-up, (Kleindorfer and Saad139
2005) introduce a framework for managing disruptions in supply chains that arise from natural140
hazards, terrorism, or political instability. In their set-up, a company is interested in the trade-141
off between the costs of risk mitigation and expected disruption costs. The authors incorporate142
economic risk mitigation incentives in the form of risk sharing.143
Another strand of literature relevant to our analysis is the design of incentives in risk manage-144
ment, such as subsidies and fines. In this regard, a number contributions offer narratives similar145
to ours. (Asche and Aven 2010) discuss business incentives for investing in safety. They argue146
that incentives to implement higher safety standards are effective only if the safety measures are147
profit enhancing. By contrast, (Kadambe and Segerson 1998) analyse the effects of a fine on the148
probability of a negative externality. They show that, in the absence of indirect effects, an increase149
in the fine reduces the probability of a violation and thus leads to a lower pollution. However,150
if indirect effects are positive and large, an increase in the fine may reduce the likelihood that a151
firm will comply with environmental regulation. Thus, increased fines do not necessarily enhance152
compliance.153
Main contribution154
The focus of our article is in the spirit of these contributions in considering the contractual155
relationship between a regulator and an operator. Optimal risk regulation trades off safety costs156
against marginal damage costs. The operator may exploit the informational asymmetries and157
limited liability arrangement by under-investing in safety measures to the detriment of society. Our158
article builds on (Hiriart and Martimort 2012) who analyse a moral hazard problem arising in159
the regulation of firms undertaking projects that are important for society. They show that under160
asymmetric information and limited liability the firm’s investment into safety measures is below the161
socially optimal level. Their paper provides an in-depth analysis, but unfortunately, is not directly162
applicable to settings arising in engineering. Our article develops a refinement and modification of163
(Hiriart and Martimort 2012) by including scenarios in which an operator may involuntarily default164
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and by adapting the setting to general probability distributions.165
Given the standard assumptions of risk neutrality, informational asymmetry, and limited lia-166
bility, we formulate a principal-agent model with three agents: a government, a regulator, and an167
operator. The regulator can allay the moral hazard problem, which is a source of uncertainty in168
the decision making process, by offering the operator a transfer payment. This transfer payment169
is performance based in that it relates the operator’s wealth to an observable and verifiable state170
of possible environmental damage as proposed in (Laffont and Martimort 2002). (Laffont 1994)171
emphasises that payments based on safety performance require both the ability to determine the172
safety design parameters needed to mitigate risk ex ante and the ability to measure and verify173
environmental damage ex post. These requirements are difficult to fulfill because the knowledge174
of how accidents relate to environmental damage is limited and methods to estimate damage costs,175
such as replacement costs, are problematic.176
Our analysis contributes to the risk management literature by offering an explanation as to177
why stakeholders tend to ignore the potential costly consequences entailed by the failure of civil178
engineering projects with the focus on rare but extreme natural hazards. This article is organised179
as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic elements of the model. Section 3 investigates the case180
of a risk-neutral operator with full liability. Section 4 considers scenarios in which the operator181
has limited assets to compensate the damage caused by floods. A welfare analysis between full and182
limited liability is carried out in Section 5. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.183
GAME-THEORETIC SETTING184
We consider a relationship between a regulator and an operator in which the operator is better185
informed with respect to safety design parameters that determine the effectiveness of a sea defence.186
The sea defence is needed to protect a critical infrastructure of a society such as a (nuclear) power187
plant. The effectiveness of the sea defence is defined by the maximum run-up height of a tsunami188
0 up to which the infrastructure is protected. It is determined by parameters, such as the safety189
design, the quality of materials, the technology used, and the operator’s expertise.190
The game theoretic setting with the sequence of actions of our model is illustrated in Figure 3.191
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The asymmetric-information assumption necessitates a regulator whose task is to align the interests192
of society with the operator’s objectives. To this end, the regulator offers the operator a contract193
for designing and building a sea defence to protect the infrastructure against floods caused by a194
tsunami. We assume that the regulator has not enough resources to validate the design parameters195
and thus cannot verify ex ante whether the infrastructure is protected effectively. The regulator,196
therefore, cannot directly condition the contract on the design parameters. The contract is instead197
conditioned on realised damage costs caused by floods as these are observable and thus can be198
verified. For simplicity, we assume that the fine  is proportional to the damage cost , so that199
 = X 5 with 0 ≤ X 5 ≤ 1.200
The contract between the government and the operator is specified by a transfer payment ) that201
covers all costs of the operator and a fine  that the operator has to pay in case the sea defence fails202
to protect the infrastructure. The transfer payment ) is the amount payed by society to the operator203
so that the operator is willing to carry out the task assigned to her. A transfer payment, therefore, has204
to cover all costs associated with implementing the project and the risk costs of contingent damages205
the operator is liable for. The fine  is the amount the operator has to pay in case the sea defence206
fails to protect the infrastructure. Since the magnitude of the tsunami is assumed to be predictable,207
the operator will be fined for events within and beyond design basis. The reason for this choice is208
the above mentioned moral hazard problem of the operator who has an incentive to underplay the209
residual risk of extreme events. In the context of our principal-agent framework, we will analyse210
and compare two cases. First, the case with full liability of the operator. Second, the case with211
limited liability. The case with limited liability takes into account the fact that the operator may212
financially not be able to cover extremely high losses. The fine, therefore, is capped. Losses below213
this cap, could thus be interpreted as failures within design basis for which the operator is liable,214
while losses above the cap may be interpreted as beyond design basis.215
The Fukushima nuclear plant was subject to a 10 meters high tsunami and a 9.0 magnitude216
earthquakewhen the plant was built to withstand tsunamis with amaximum height of 5.7meters and217
earthquakes with a maximum magnitude of 7.5. However, earthquakes of comparable magnitude218
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have struck the northeast coast of Japan, on average, every 100 years, each one generating a219
devastating tsunami (Acton and Hibbs 2012). In fact, a tsunami in 1933 was almost precisely as220
high as the one that struck Japan on March 2011. Following this line of reasoning, the Fukushima221
nuclear accident occurred due to a poor design of the sea defence below the design basis.222
The operator accepts the contract and implements the sea defence if the offered transfer payment223
is higher than theminimum payment she requires to receive. Wewill refer to this minimum payment224
as the participation constraint of the operator.225
The probability distribution of the damage costs depends on the tsunami run-up height ℎ, which226
in turn is modelled as a random variable. Since the probability of a flooding is a decreasing function227
of the effective sea defence 0, the operator can reduce the likelihood of a flooding by enhancing 0.228
Based on a risk assessment, the operator chooses an optimal effective sea defence 0 that maximises229
her pay-off before knowing the realisation of the damage costs. Since we assume that a sea defence230
that rules out a flooding with certainty is technologically impossible, society retains a residual231
flooding risk.232
Given a contract, the regulator, the operator, and society can evaluate the damage cost distri-233
bution associated with a sea defence. The stakeholders’ pay-offs are stipulated as follows. The234
operator’s pay-off is the random variable235
%̃$ = ) − i(0) − ̃. (1)236
This pay-off is a function of the effective sea defence 0, the transfer payment) , and the fine ̃ which237
is a random variable. The operator’s cost of implementing 0 is determined by the cost function i.238
The pay-off of the society is given by the random variable239
%̃( = ( − ) − ̃ + ̃. (2)240
This pay-off is a function of society’s revenue (, the transfer payment ) , the damage cost ̃, and241
the fine ̃. The society receives a fixed revenue ( from the infrastructure and pays a transfer242
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payment ) to the operator for the implementation of the sea defence. The regulator’s objective is243
to enhance social welfare by maximizing the weighted sum of society’s and the operator’s pay-off,244
where the weight parameter 0 ≤ U' ≤ 1 is the relative weight the regulator assigns to the operator’s245
pay-off in relation to the pay-off of the society. The regulator’s pay-off then is the weighted sum246
%̃' = %̃( + U' %̃$ and conveniently rewritten as247
%̃' = ( − i(0) − ̃ − (1 − U')%̃$ . (3)248
REGULATION UNDER FULL LIABILITY249
We consider an operator who cares only about expected pay-offs and thus, by definition, is risk250
neutral. The fine imposed on the operator is assumed to be proportional to the random damage,251
so that ̃ = X 5 ̃ with 0 ≤ X 5 ≤ 1 and ̃ = k( ℎ̃ − 0), where ℎ̃ is the random run-up height of252
a tsunami. Here, k takes into account only run-up heights exceeding the effective sea defence253
0 because only these will incur damage costs. The following assumptions on cost functions are254
convenient and standard in the economics literature.255
Assumption 1. The cost of implementing the effective sea defence is determined by a convex cost256
function i, such that i′ > 0, i′′ ≥ 0, and i(0) = 0.257
Assumption 2. The damage cost incurred by a tsunami is a convex function k of 0, such that258
k′ > 0, k′′ ≥ 0, and k(ℎ) = 0 for all ℎ ≤ 0.259
Assumption 3. The tsunami run up height is log-normally distributed with probability density260
function 5 .261
Empirical observations of tsunamis on the coast of the Hawaiian Island in 1946 and 1957, the262
Japanese coast (mainly along the Sariku coast) in 1896, 1933, 1946, 1960, 1964, and 1968, and263
on the coast of the Kurile Island between 1896 and 1981 confirm that the spatial distribution of264
tsunami run-up heights is reasonably well characterised by a log-normal distribution, see (Choi265
et al. 2002).266
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Assumption 4. The regulator cannot verify ex ante how effective the implemented sea defence267
against tsunamis is.268
With these assumptions, the operator’s pay-off (1) takes the form
%̃$ = ) − i(0) − X 5k( ℎ̃ − 0). (4)
The expected pay-off of the operator is
 [%̃$] = ) − i(0) − X 5
∫ ∞
0
k(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ, (5)




k(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ
are a function of 0. Given that the distribution of the run-up height is common knowledge, the269
operator will choose the effective sea defence 0 so as to maximize the objective function270
 [%̃$] = ) − i(0) − X 5
∫ ∞
0
k(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ.271
Assuming that the operator believes that the probability of a negative pay-off is negligible, her272
optimization problem takes the form273
<0G(0≥0) [%̃$] . (6)274
Lemma 1. Let the hypotheses of Assumption 1 and 2 be satisfied. Then the decision problem of275
the operator (6) has an unique solution 0∗, which is determined by the first order condition (FOC)276
i′(0∗) = X 5
∫ ∞
0∗
k′(ℎ − 0∗) 5 (ℎ)dℎ. (7)277
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The optimal effective sea defence 0∗ = 0∗(X 5 ) is an increasing function of X 5 and independent of278
) .279
Proof. The l.h.s. of the first order condition (7), which is i′(0), is by assumption increasing in 0,280
while the r.h.s. '((0) = X 5
∫ ∞
0
k′(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)dℎ is decreasing in 0. Moreover, '((0) > 0 and281
lim0→∞ '((0) = 0, while i′(0) = 0. Hence 0∗ with i′(0∗) = '((0∗) exists. Moreover, 0∗ is282
unique because the objective function (6) is strictly concave. The last statement follows from the283
fact that the RHS of (7) is increasing X 5 , so that 0∗ = 0∗(X 5 ) is an increasing function of X 5 . 284
Given a transfer payment ) and a fine X 5 , denote by285




the expected pay-off of the operator that implements 0∗ = 0∗(X 5 ). The corresponding expected287
payoff of society then is288




In view of the fact that the operator maximizes its own profit irrespective of social welfare, the290
regulator designs a contract by setting a transfer payment ) and a fine X 5 so as to maximize291
Π' (), X 5 ) = Π( (), X 5 ) + U'Π$ (), X 5 ), (8)292
while satisfying the participation constraint of the operator. More formally, the regulator’s decision
problem is
<0G(),X 5 )Π' (), X 5 )
subject to the operator’s participation constraint293
Π$ (), X 5 )] ≥ ?0. (9)294
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Here, ?0 is the reservation pay-off of the operator. Given a fine, the transfer payment must be large295
enough to guarantee that the expected pay-off of the regulator is at least as high as the reservation296
pay-off.297
It is not difficult to see that in an optimum ()∗X∗
5
), inequality (9) must hold with equality. The298
reason is that Π$ is linear in ) . If the participation constraint were not binding Π$ ()∗, X∗5 ) > ?0,299
then )∗ could be lowered by a small amount n without violating the participation constraint,300
thereby increasing the regulator’s pay-off (8). Hence, given X∗
5
, the optimal transfer payment )∗ is301
determined by the binding participation constraint.302
The regulator’s decision problem can now be addressed as follows. Since 0∗(X 5 ) is an increasing303
function of X 5 , there is an one-to-one correspondence between fines and effective sea defences.304
The regulator’s problem may therefore be transformed to an equivalent problem that determines305
the optimal effective sea defence 0 from the regulator’s point of view. Using (3), this optimization306
problem is given by307
<0G(0≥0)
(
( − i(0) −
∫ ∞
0
k(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ − (1 − U')?0
)
. (10)308
Theorem 1. Let the hypothesis of Lemma 1 be satisfied. Then the optimal regulatory policy under309
asymmetric information, risk neutrality, and full liability is determined by an optimal fine X∗
5
and310
an optimal transfer payment )∗, such that the following holds true:311
1. The regulator sets a fine equal to damage costs, that is, X∗
5
= 1.312
2. The optimal transfer payment is
)∗ = ?0 + i(0∗∗) +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)],
where 0∗∗ solves (10).313
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k′(ℎ − 0∗∗) 5 (ℎ)dℎ, (11)315
so that 0∗∗ = 0∗(X∗
5
), where 0∗(X 5 ) was defined in Lemma 1.316
Proof. The l.h.s. of the first order condition (11), i.e. i′(0), is by assumption increasing in 0,317
while the r.h.s. '((0) :=
∫ ∞
0
k′(ℎ − 0) 5 (ℎ)dℎ is decreasing in 0. Moreover, '((0) > 0 and318
lim0→∞ '((0) = 0, while i′(0) = 0. Hence 0∗∗ with i′(0∗∗) = '((0∗∗) exists. Moreover, 0∗∗319
is unique because the objective function (11) is strictly concave. A comparison of the FOCs (7)320
and (11) shows that 0∗(X∗
5
) = 0∗∗ with X∗
5
= 1. 321
Since the optimal fine is X∗
5
= 1, it is optimal for the operator to implement the socially optimal322
effective sea defence 0∗∗, provided that the participation constraint holds. As 0∗∗ is independent of323
transfer payments, the regulator may simply set324
)∗ = ?0 + i(0∗∗) +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)], (12)325
where i(0∗∗) is the cost of implementing 0∗∗,  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)] is the expected fine and ?0 is the326
reservation pay-off. The transfer payment)∗ is theminimum payment that satisfies the participation327
constraint, so that in an optimum, the operator will on average earn her reservation pay-off ?0.328
Economists refer to )∗ as the first-best payment.329
Next, we present a numerical example of an implementation of an optimal effective sea defence330
for the protection of a critical energy infrastructure, e.g. a nuclear power plant from tsunamis.331
Example 1. Suppose that the damage cost function is given by the power function332
k( ℎ̃ − 0) = 1( ℎ̃ − 0)V, (13)333
where the effectiveness of the sea defence 0 can take any value in the interval [0, 10], ℎ̃ is a334
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truncated log-normally distributed run-up height (meters) with parameters N(4.5, 0.9) whose335
support is (0, 10), and 1 > 0 and V ≥ 1 are cost parameters (millione). The costs of implementing336




where 2 is the marginal cost with a value of 0.05millione. The revenue of society from running339
the nuclear power plant for a period of 50 years is ( = 400millione. The regulator’s decision340
problem is to design a contract consisting of (1) a fine parameter X 5 that induces the operator341
to implement the socially optimal effective sea defence and (2) a transfer payment ) (millione)342
that satisfies the operator’s participation constraint. We note that, in the presence of asymmetric343
information, the operator implements a sea defence below the social optimum, 0∗ < 0∗∗. In order344
to incentivize the operator to implement the socially optimal sea defence, the fine parameter has345
to be raised. By setting X 5 equal to 1, the operator implements the socially optimum effective sea346
defence, such that 0∗(X∗
5
) = 0∗∗. Because the fine is equal to damage cost, the optimal transfer347
payment has to guarantee that the expected pay-off (millione) of the operator is at least as large348
as 4millione, which is the value of the reservation pay-off ?0. To do so, society pays a transfer349
)∗, which is the minimum amount of money that the operator will accept in order to implement the350
sea defence.351
Table 1 analyses the socially optimal effective sea defence, the transfer payment, and the352
exceeding probability of occurrence in a year (residual damage risk) when the cost parameters 1353
takes the values 1 = 50, 100, 200 and V the values V = 1, 1.5, 2. The residual damage risk is the354
probability that the socially optimal sea defence will fail to protect the energy infrastructure from355
flooding.356
We observe that the operator will enhance the effectiveness of the socially optimal sea defence357
as the cost parameter 1 increases. Clearly, a higher socially optimal sea defence results in a lower358
residual damage risk. In practice, the frequency of floods is measured by means of a recurrence359
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interval, which is defined as the average number of years between floods of a certain height. For360
example, the recurrence interval of 100 years for a flood of a certain height suggests that in any361
year, a flood of that magnitude has a 1% exceedance probability of occurrence, e.g. (Holmes362
and Dinicola 2010). The observable realizations of damage costs in an initial period enables363
the regulator to gain more information on implemented safety measures for later periods. This364
information can be utilized ex post to renegotiate the terms of the contract, cf. (Baron and Besanko365
1987; Laffont and Tirole 1988).366
REGULATION UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY367
In the previous scenario, the fine imposed on the operator was equal to the damage costs368
incurred by a natural hazard. These costs could, in principle, exceed the operator’s private assets,369
thus bankrupting the operator. Indeed, it follows from Theorem 1 that in an optimum, the realized370
pay-off of the operator is determined by the random variable371
%̃∗$ = ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0
∗∗)] − k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗). (15)372
This shows that %̃∗
$
is negative for all sufficiently large run-up heights ℎ̃. We assumed that the risk373
of such an event is negligibly small so that it is ignored by both the operator and the regulator. The374
society, however, has no interest in insolvent operators because it would have to bear all excess costs.375
Therefore, it should take possible bankruptcies into account along with the excess costs an operator376
would not be able to cover. To ensure that the pay-off of the operator is always non-negative, we377
therefore introduce a liability constraint, which in our setting takes the form of a fine cap .378
Let ̃ = min {̃, } denote the possible fine charged to the operator, where ̃ = k( ℎ̃ − 0) is379
the damage costs incurred by the random height ℎ̃ of the tsunami run up. The operator can now be380
fined up to the cap  only so that the society will bear all damage costs exceeding . It is clear that381
the probability of costs exceeding the cap  is decreasing in  and may become arbitrarily small.382
We are interested in the case in which the probability of costs exceeding  is positive no matter383
how large  is. The operator’s pay-off now accounts for the cap on the fine that can be imposed384
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and takes the form385
%̃$ = ) − i(0) −min {k( ℎ̃ − 0), }. (16)386
The cap on the fine allows the regulator to ensure that the operator’s pay-off is always non-negative387
by setting) sufficiently high. Under limited liability, the operator takes into account that she cannot388
be made liable for costs exceeding , so that her expected pay-off becomes389
 [%̃$] = ) − i(0) −  [min{k( ℎ̃ − 0), }] . (17)390
The operator’s optimization problem is the choice of an effective sea defence 0 so as to maximize391
her expected pay-off  [%̃$]. Formally, the optimization problem reads392
<0G(0≥0) [%̃$] . (18)393
Lemma 2. Let the hypothesis of Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then the decision problem of the394
operator has an unique solution 0∗
;;







k′(ℎ − 0∗;;) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ, (19)396





independent of ) .398
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. Observe to this end that
 [min{k( ℎ̃ − 0), }] =
∫ ∞
0








with k( ℎ̄) = . The l.h.s. of the first order condition (19) is increasing in 0, while the r.h.s. is399
decreasing in 0, and lim0→∞ '((0) = 0. Furthermore, the marginal cost and the marginal fine400
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because the objective function (18) is strictly concave. A comparison of the FOCs (11) and (19)402
shows that 0∗∗ > 0∗
;;
() because the cap on the fine induces a distortion from the socially optimal403
sea defence. 404




Under limited liability, any realization of the operator’s pay-offmust be non-negative. Formally,407
this limited liability constraint is408
%̃$ ≥ 0. (20)409
If 0∗
;;
is implemented, then the operator’s pay-off becomes
%̃$ = ) − i(0∗;;) −min{k( ℎ̃ − 0
∗
;;), },
which is positive for any realization of ℎ̃, provided that the transfer payment ) is large enough.
Indeed, since %̃$ ≥ ) − i(0∗;;) − , the liability constraint (20) is fulfilled whenever the transfer
payment covers the implementation costs and the maximum fine, i.e.
) ≥ i(0∗;;) + .
The expected pay-off of the operator then becomes
 [%̃$] = ) − i(0∗;;) − 
[
min{k( ℎ̃ − 0∗;;), }
]
and the participation constraint  [%̃$] ≥ ?0 is fulfilled, if and only if410
) ≥ ?0 + i(0∗;;) + 
[
min{k( ℎ̃ − 0∗;;), }
]
.411
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It follows that the limited-liability and the participation constraint are both satisfied whenever412




, ?0 + 
[







() as before. The amount )∗
;;
is the minimum payment for a sea defence a society414
has to pay to the operator. Observe that)∗
;;
is a function of the fine cap . Inserting)∗
;;
, the expected415
pay-off of the operator becomes416
 [%̃$] = max
{







(). Since the r.h.s. of (22) is a function of the fine cap , it is convenient to set418
R() := max
{
 −  [min{k
(
ℎ̃ − 0∗;; ()
)
, }] , ?0
}
. (23)419
This definition reveals that the participation constraint of the operator is always satisfied, because420
R() ≥ ?0. Contrary to the full-liability case, the operator will, on average, earn more than her421
reservation pay-off ?0. In economics, the difference R() − ?0 ≥ 0 is referred to as the liability422
rent of the operator. Since the R is non-decreasing in fine caps , so is the liability rent. Moreover,423
a straightforward calculation reveals that there exists a largest fine cap 0 with R(0) = ?0 so that424
R is increasing for all  ≥ 0425
The question of which fine cap  is socially optimal arises. Using (22), the expected pay-off426
of the regulator takes the form427





k(ℎ − 0∗;; ()) 5 (ℎ)3ℎ − (1 − U')R(). (24)428
Since the liability constraint (20) is by construction always satisfied, the regulator’s maximization429
problem takes the form430
<0G(≥0)Π' (). (25)431
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In other words, the optimal contract under limited liability is a fine cap  that maximizes the432
weighted sum of the expected pay-offs of society and the operator.433
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied. Then, a uniquely determined optimal regulatory434
policy under asymmetric information, risk neutrality, and limited liability exists. It is determined435
by the following:436
1. The regulator sets the optimal fine cap ∗ ≥ 0 that solves (25). This fine cap is uniquely437
determined.438
2. The optimal transfer payment set by the regulator consists the implementation costs and the439








(∗) is the optimal440
effective sea defence.441
3. If the participation constraint is not binding, i.e. ∗ > 0, then 

















Proof. The proof is analogously to the proof of Theorem 1. The l.h.s. of the first order condition446
(26) is increasing in 0, while the r.h.s. is decreasing in 0, and lim0→∞ '((0) = 0. Furthermore,447





is unique because the objective function (25) is strictly concave. Moreover,449
we deduce that the optimal effective sea defence 0∗∗
;;






Since ∗ ≥ 0, we have452

∗ ≥ ?0 + 
[








) + ∗. 454
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Proof. This follows from a comparison of the first order conditions (11) and (26), the fact that457
R() and 0∗
;;
() are both increasing for  ≥ 0. 458
Corollary 2 implies that the regulator can only implement a second best protection against459
floods, as the effective see defence under limited liability is lower. This result is caused by the460
positive liability rent that accounts for the fact that the operator will not be able to cover losses461
above ∗.462
Example 2. The limited liability scenario is computed using the damage cost function (13) and the463
cost function (14) from Example 1. The numerical values and units of the parameter values are464
also adopted from this example. Contrary to the full liability case, the regulator now sets a fine465
cap to avoid negative pay-offs of the operator. This optimal fine cap ∗ (millione) is analysed in466
Table 2, for different weight parameters U' = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.467
We observe from Table 2 that the fine cap increases with the cost parameters 1 and V and468
decreases with the weight parameter U'. Table 3 lists the levels of effectiveness under limited469
liability 0∗∗
;;
(lower row) and the levels of effectiveness under full liability 0∗∗ (upper row) for the470
same parameter values as in Table 2.471
A fine cap under limited liability causes a distortion, inducing the operator to implement an472
effective sea defence lower than the socially optimal level under full liability. Table 3 shows that473
this difference increases with the weight parameter U'. This finding demonstrates that the transfer474
payment under limited liability is always higher than under full liability. The reason is that the fine475
cap ∗ is always larger than the expected damage cost  [̃ ( ℎ̃, 0∗∗)]. Since the transfer payment476
under limited liability)∗∗
;;
is a function of the fine cap and the transfer payment under full liability)∗477
is a function of the expected damage cost, )∗∗
;;
is always larger than )∗. The intuition for this finding478
is that the transfer payment under limited liability must prevent the operator from insolvency. This479
result is illustrated in Table 4 for the values of the weight parameter U', where the upper row is the480
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optimal transfer payment under full liability )∗ and the lower row is the optimal transfer payment481
under limited liability )∗∗
;;
.482
We observe from Table 4 that the optimal transfer payment under limited liability )∗∗
;;
increases483
significantly as the cost parameter 1 increases and the weight parameter U' decreases.484
The residual damage risk for floods after the implementation of sea defences are presented in485
Table 5. Herein, the upper row corresponds to full liability and the lower row corresponds to486
limited liability case. Consistent with the observations in Table 3, the probability that the optimal487
effective sea defence fails is higher under limited liability than under full liability. The difference488
in residual damage risk between full and limited liability significantly increases with the weight489
parameter U' and decreases with the cost parameter 1.490
WELFARE ANALYSIS491
In the full liability section we observed that imposing a fine which is proportional to damage492
costs may induce negative pay-offs for the operator whenever the run-up height is sufficiently high.493
In large engineering projects, such events are frequently ignored, because they are thought to occur494
with negligible likelihood. The limited liability case discussed above demonstrated that ignoring495
this residual risk leads to more effective sea defences. In terms of damage costs, however, the496
economic consequences of neglecting residual risk may be quite severe.497
To illustrate this point, let us discuss a potential scenario for the two regulatory regimes. Recall
that under the assumption of full liability, the operator’s payoff is positive
%̃∗$ = ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0
∗∗)] − k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗) ≥ 0 if and only if ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)] ≥ k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗),
where )∗ = ?0 + i(0∗∗) + [k( ℎ̃− 0∗∗)] is the optimal transfer payment. The operator will only be
able to cover damage costs up to ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)] and the upper bound of the fine the operator
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is able to pay is ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)]. The effective pay-off of the society thus becomes
%̃4( = ( − )
∗ − k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗) +min
{
k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗), ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)]
}
= ( − i(0∗∗) −max
{
k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗), ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)]
}
. (27)
Recall that the pay-off of a fully protected society would be %( = ( − )∗. Since498
%̃4( = %̃( +min
{
0, ?0 +  [k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)] − k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗)
}
,499
we see that the effective pay-off %̃4
(
is lower than the pay-off of a fully protected society, whenever500
the damage costs exceed the amount that can be covered by the operator.501
In the limited-liability case, these low-probabilities high-costs events have been taken into502
account by capping the fines. In this case, the operator’s pay-off is positive with certainty, because503
%̃∗$ = 
∗ −min{k( ℎ̃ − 0∗∗;; ), 
∗} ≥ 0,504
where the optimal transfer payment is )∗∗
;;
is given in Theorem 2. In an optimum, the pay-off of the
society then is
%̃( = ( − )∗∗;; − k( ℎ̃ − 0
∗∗








A comparison of (27) and (28) shows that, a priori, its unclear which of the two pay-offs is higher.505
Example 3. Following on from Examples 1 and 2, we compare the pay-off (27) of society in the506
full liability case with the pay-off (28) in the limited liability case. As before, the pay-offs are507
computed using the damage cost function (13) and the cost function (14). The results are presented508
in Figures 4–7, where the x-axis is the height of the run up ℎ and the y-axis is the random pay-off509
of society %(.510
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In the full-liability case, the pay-off of society (27) is represented by a solid black curve and511
depends on the cost parameters 1 and V, but is independent of the weight parameter U'. The512
reason is that under the assumptions of full liability, all rents are extracted from the operator. In513
the limited-liability case, by contrast, the pay-off of society case depends on U'. This pay-off (28)514
is presented by a dashed-dotted red curve for a weight parameter U' = 0.2, a dotted green curve515
for a weight parameter U' = 0.5, and a dashed blue curve for a weight parameter U' = 0.8. In516
each of the figures, the black horizontal line at %( = 0 marks the distinction between positive and517
negative pay-offs.518
We observe that under full liability, society is better protected from physical damage associated519
with flooding and its wealth is always higher. However, if the weight parameter U' for the operator’s520
wealth is sufficiently low, e.g. U' = 0.2, the society is protected against financial losses for a wider521
range of run-up heights.522
Furthermore, the size of the reservation pay-off ?0 plays a pivotal role for the safety and welfare523
of society. Under full liability, an increase in ?0 has no effect on the implemented sea defence524
but reduces society’s exposure to financial loss. In the limited-liability case, an increase in ?0525
increases the optimal fine cap, which in turn leads to a higher effective sea defence. However, as526
it increases the operator’s liability for damage cost, it also increases the transfer payment to the527
operator.528
Confirming the results for the limited liability case, a low weight parameter, e.g. U' = 0.2,529
cost parameters set at 1 = 100, 200 reflecting high damage costs, and a reservation pay-off of530
?0 = 4millione imply high fine caps and consequently high transfer payments. The numerical531
results for this case are presented in Table 6 which displays the relationship between liability532
protection, residual risk, and transfer payment under full (upper row) and limited liability (lower533
row). The liability protection is the run-up height up to which society is financially protected. The534
residual financial risk is the probability of a financial loss for society due to flooding. Table 6535
reveals that the cost parameters 1 and V have contradictory effects on the residual financial risk in536
the limited liability case. While 1 lowers the residual financial risk, V increases it in the extreme537
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damage scenario. This contradictory effect also occurs for transfer payments under full liability538
but not in the limited liability case. This exemplifies situations in which it is very costly to ensure the539
liability of an operator. A small reduction in the residual damage risk may cause a huge increase540
in the liability rent. Society therefore faces a trade-off dilemma between bearing residual risk of541
extreme flooding and paying huge liability rents. Note that under limited liability (V = 0.2), society542
is better protected from financial losses but less protected from physical damage.543
As reported in Table 4, it is important to note that placing more weight on the operator’s payoff544
lowers the transfer payments and thus the fine caps. As a consequence, the residual damage risk545
born by society is then significant higher so that from the point of view of safety, the project may546
become unacceptable.547
Our analysis demonstrates that a risk-neutral society may be better off ignoring the residual548
risk of infrequent accidents ex ante and bearing the damage costs ex post. Otherwise, the social549
benefits of a public project may easily be annihilated by costly liability rents that have to be paid550
upfront to operators.551
CONCLUSION552
This article studied the effectiveness of risk sharing incentives as a risk management tool in553
an uncertain environment with risk-neutral stakeholders. It argues that residual risks in large civil554
engineering projects are often underestimated. Operators, which are either too big or too important555
to fail, tend to be overly confident that a public infrastructure facility in question is safe and assume556
full liability. When rare but catastrophic events strike nevertheless, society may have to bail out557
operators in order to keep the facility in operation.558
This article finds that taking into account that operators may not be able to cover the damage559
costs for rare but extreme events may have adverse effects on the safety of a facility as well as on560
the costs for society. If society wants to reduce the residual risk of rare but extreme events, it has to561
enable the operator to cover the incurred damage costs. As these can be very high, the society will562
have to pay for an extremely high liability rent upfront while the safety of the facility is negatively563
affected. Therefore, society is better off ignoring the residual risk by pretending that operators are564
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full liable ex ante and paying the excess damage costs ex post in those cases in which the operator565
is bankrupt. This insight of our article contradicts the conventional wisdom that society is fully566
protected when imposing full liability on operators. Modern societies are challenged with the567
dilemma of how much residual risk they are willing to accept, given the economic benefits from568
public projects such as affordable electricity, low carbon emissions, or the creation of jobs. The569
present article translates this issue into a trade-off problem between an acceptable level of residual570
risk and the costs of further risk reduction.571
The approach of this article can be extended in several directions. First, the approach could572
be easily generalized to any contracted project aimed at risk reduction. This could be achieved573
simply by changing 0 to a generic output parameter and ℎ to a generic variable that captures574
uncertainty. Second, from an economic viewpoint, the strong economic rationality assumption575
could be relaxed to bounded-rationality to better account for the complexity of the problem.576
The regulatory policy could then be based on imprecise probabilities for damage costs, implying577
that an operator implements a structural project which may not be optimal, but from a practical578
point of view is more realistic. As failure risk was at the centre of this investigation, it would579
be interesting to explore scenarios with risk-averse stakeholders. Third, from the standpoint of580
operations management, agent-based modelling can allow enhancement of reliability analysis by581
integrating technical, economic and contractual aspects. Agent-based modelling can be designed582
to include a dynamic relationship between the operator and the regulator to understand how time-583
dependant risk mitigation measures determine the reliability of infrastructure projects within a584
regulatory framework. Finally, from an engineering viewpoint, it would be interesting to explore585
model extensions with a more elaborate description of a specific project with all the technically586
relevant parameters.587
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Socially optimal sea defence
(level of effectiveness) 7.174 7.154 7.194 7.530 7.490 7.510 7.885 7.826 7.787
Transfer payment
(millione) 5.46 5.46 5.46 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.72 5.69 5.68
Residual damage risk
(%) 0.739 0.765 0.709 0.366 0.399 0.382 0.177 0.201 0.218
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U' = 0.2 27.67 35.57 48.42 75.10 130.40 179.80 330.00 341.90 349.80
U' = 0.5 8.20 10.57 12.85 17.79 22.73 28.66 61.26 63.24 64.23
U' = 0.8 4.94 5.93 6.92 9.88 11.86 14.82 30.63 32.61 35.57
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Table 3. Comparison of the optimal effective sea defence under full and limited liability
Optimal sea defence
(Level of effectiveness)


























7.174 7.154 7.194 7.530 7.490 7.510 7.885 7.826 7.787
6.996 6.937 6.917 7.431 7.431 7.451 7.866 7.806 7.767
U' = 0.5
7.174 7.154 7.194 7.530 7.490 7.510 7.885 7.826 7.787
6.591 6.581 6.561 6.957 6.897 6.877 7.490 7.401 7.292
U' = 0.8
7.174 7.154 7.194 7.530 7.490 7.510 7.885 7.826 7.787
6.250 6.225 6.304 6.700 6.680 6.700 7.134 7.095 7.055
34 Nieto-Cerezo, April 6, 2020
Table 4. Comparison of the optimal transfer payment under full and limited liability
Transfer payment
(millione)


























5.46 5.46 5.46 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.72 5.69 5.68
28.89 36.77 49.62 76.48 131.78 179.19 331.55 343.42 351.00
U' = 0.5
5.46 5.46 5.46 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.72 5.69 5.68
9.29 11.65 13.93 19.00 23.92 29.84 62.66 64.61 65.55
U' = 0.8
5.46 5.46 5.46 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.72 5.69 5.68
5.92 6.90 7.91 11.00 12.98 15.94 31.90 33.87 36.81
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Table 5. Comparison of the residual damage risk under full and limited liability
Residual damage risk
(%)


























0.739 0.765 0.709 0.366 0.399 0.382 0.177 0.201 0.218
1.027 1.157 1.195 0.449 0.449 0.431 0.184 0.210 0.226
U' = 0.5
0.739 0.765 0.709 0.366 0.399 0.382 0.177 0.201 0.218
2.137 2.215 2.294 1.110 1.239 1.289 0.399 0.485 0.591
U' = 0.8
0.739 0.765 0.709 0.366 0.399 0.382 0.177 0.201 0.218
4.033 4.165 3.628 1.790 1.861 1.790 0.796 0.854 0.921
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Table 6. Relationship between liability protection, residual financial risk, and transfer payment



























Liability protection 7.253 7.332 7.470 7.569 7.589 7.708 7.905 7.905 7.925
(up to run up heights (m)) 7.549 7.727 7.885 8.182 8.617 8.775 9.407 9.229 9.071
Residual financial risk 0.632 0.540 0.411 0.335 0.323 0.253 0.170 0.170 0.162
(%) 0.359 0.245 0.175 0.094 0.037 0.025 0.005 0.008 0.012
Transfer payment 5.46 5.46 5.46 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.72 5.69 5.68
(millione) 28.89 36.77 49.62 76.48 131.78 179.19 331.55 343.42 351.00
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Fig. 1. Stakeholders in a flood defence project.
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Fig. 2. Conceptual framework for risk analysis, adapted from Cohen and Kunreuther 2007.
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Fig. 3. Sequence of actions.
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Fig. 4. Pay-offs (b=50, V = 1)
 
Fig. 5. Pay-offs(b=50, V = 2)
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Fig. 6. Pay-offs (b=200, V = 1)
 
Fig. 7. Pay-offs (b=200, V = 2)
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